Monday, December 9, 2019

Campaigning in a Crowded Primary


My Experiences as an Intern on Kamala Harris's Presidential Campaign

Background 
            I knew from the moment I watched Senator Kamala Harris grill Brett Kavanaugh in his Senate Judiciary Committee hearing to become a Supreme Court Justice on September 5th, 2018 that I wanted her to become our next president. She delivered biting and probing questions as only a seasoned prosecutor can, but moreover, she showed a seriousness and steadiness that has been lacking throughout the current administration.
            Four months later, Sen. Harris announced that she would run for President. I was thrilled, but I also wanted to give a fair shot to other candidates before I went all-in. By June 27th, the night of the first Democratic debate, I had made up my mind; I would be supporting Kamala. That was the night she famously eviscerated Vice President Biden’s handling of issues of race, showing she has what it takes to go toe-to-toe with Donald Trump in the general election. 

Two weeks later, I reached out to the southwest Iowa regional organizing director, Jess Montgomery, inquiring about a potential internship with the campaign. I knew that one of my two remaining classes in my master’s program through the University of Nebraska Omaha would be a political science internship, and the fall semester would be the only time that I would have a full semester of not deploying. I also recognized next-door Iowa’s clear and outsized importance in the nominating process. The stars seemed to align.

The Grind
            Campaigning and organizing is not always fun work; in fact, it is often quite frustrating. The immediate goal of any campaign should be identifying potential supporters as well as those supporting other candidates. The two main tools our campaign used to achieve this goal were the two most traditional ones: phonebanking and canvassing. However, in the age of caller-ID, only a tiny fraction of potential caucus-goers pick up the phone, and of the ones who do, even fewer would say they were supporting or leaning towards supporting Sen. Harris. Canvassing, or going door-to-door, typically had a much higher response rate, but again very few people were ready or willing to commit to any one candidate, much less my candidate.  
            Of the two methods, I much preferred canvassing, even as the seasons changed from miserably hot to chillingly cold. I enjoyed speaking with people face to face. Not only did I connect with more people, but they were typically nicer and more willing to chat for extended periods. One woman I met was most concerned with education, specifically if her children would be able to get quality education when classroom size and teacher pay dissuaded quality educators from joining or keeping that career. I told her about Sen. Harris’s plan that would raise teacher pay across America by an average of $13,000, and she was sold. Another man, whom I could not ultimately convince to caucus for Kamala, chatted with me for nearly an hour about various issues and his thoughts on the candidates. He was very wealthy, and after he offered to hold a fundraising event for the Senator, I suspected he was holding out his support for any candidate he could meet personally.  

           Of course, not all interactions were quite as pleasant. Many people either yelled from inside their house “GO AWAY!” or outright shut the door in my face after opening it. One woman shouted that we live in America and I can’t tell her who to vote for, despite the fact that I had only just introduced myself and not asked any questions. One of the final interactions I had on the campaign was with a man who said “hell no” to Kamala and declared “Trump 2020”. I thanked him for his time and turned to leave, but he apparently wasn’t done; he wanted to regurgitate every Fox News talking point he had heard over the past few weeks of impeachment hearings, in an apparent effort to get under my skin. It didn’t work.
            For every potential voter who had an opinion or preference, though, there were dozens who were undecided. This, I believe, was undoubtedly a product of the historically large field of candidates running in the crowded primary. Iowans are famously careful about who they ultimately decide to caucus for – they do their research, they go to local events to hear the candidates in person, and they ultimately make an informed decision. But with two dozen candidates running for the nomination, there is a lot to potentially like, and even more to research. Even today, only two months out from the Iowa caucuses, only one-third of voters are strongly committed to their first choice, even as the field has winnowed.
            Canvassing and phonebanking weren’t my only roles in the campaign. I organized two debate watch parties, the first at my house and the second at a bar in Omaha. I recruited college students at both UNO and UNL, and even analyzed past precinct-level voter files to determine the best precincts to target. By mid-October, I was made the Omaha team captain, which mostly just consisted of organizing events for those in Nebraska to attend. My biggest and most unique role in the campaign, however, was creating a weekly newsletter sent to supporters and shared digitally via Facebook and Twitter that highlighted various policies, favorable news articles, and upcoming events. To my knowledge, the southwest Iowa region was the only one that created a product like that.
            The southwest Iowa regional office was located in downtown Council Bluffs, which was beneficial for two reason – one strategic and one personal. Pottawattamie County, home to Council Bluffs, is by far the largest county by population in the region, meaning our staffers and volunteers had nearby access to thousands of potential caucus-goers. For myself, it was highly convenient that my commute to the office was only a 30 minute drive from my house. Typically, each week I would work at the office (or canvass in Council Bluffs) on Tuesday and Thursday evenings, as well as either Saturday or Sunday afternoons. Unfortunately, that schedule meant I would be away from my family during times we normally spend together. To make matters more difficult, my husband, Zach, was then left alone to have to watch and raise our two children. While he’s no stranger to single-parent ops (I deploy an average of 120 days/year), there were certainly times when I felt bad about willingly choosing time campaigning over time with Zach and the twins.
            For as much as I worked and was away from my family, however, the permanent staff on the campaign had it much worse. The Harris campaign was the first to go to a 7-day work-week in early September, usually working 10+ hour days. They moved from all over the country, leaving their friends and family behind, to work for Sen. Harris’s campaign. Our organizers included Rochelle Golliday, who had been an intern for First Lady Michelle Obama and worked on Hillary Clinton’s Iowa campaign; Jake Fields, a former staffer for Jacky Rosen’s 2018 Senate campaign; Leo McCaffrey, an organizer for Haley Stevens in Michigan in 2018; Rachel Jordan, who worked on Governor Martin O’Malley’s campaign; Jonny Vannucci, who interned at both the State Department and the UN; and Natalie Weiss, a local activist from Lincoln, Nebraska. Each one of them was a pleasure to work and spend time with, and I will forever value their friendships and our experiences together.

The Failures
            Senator Kamala Harris suspended her campaign last week after months of declining poll numbers and a lack of cash-on-hand to continue in a serious and honest way. Like many, the decision to end her campaign left me in shock and with a wide array of emotions. Strategically, I was dumbfounded as to why she would leave the contest when she was consistently still polling in 5th place (albeit in the mid-single digits) and was one of only seven candidates to have so-far qualified for the December debate. I believed that a strong performance, like that in the June debate, could have had the potential to jump-start her candidacy, bring in more donations, and breathe new life into her stalled campaign. Additionally, on some level I felt betrayed; I of course realize that there will eventually only be one nominee and had been of the belief for some time that it was very unlikely that she would ultimately be that nominee, but ending her campaign before even the first vote was cast meant that all our hard work over the past few months would see no tangible results, even if the results may not have been favorable.  

            At the same time, as I said, it was becoming increasingly clear that Kamala would not perform well in Iowa, and staying in the race would only pull support and attention from candidates more likely to win or do well. The political scientist and pragmatist in me knows that a greatly protracted primary campaign will likely only help one person: Donald Trump. By that measure, her exit now leaves her supporters able to shop around for other candidates, potentially helping the eventual nominee’s victory be more decisive.
            A lot has been written about the failure of Sen. Harris’s campaign, and I’m sure even more is yet to come. She was often referred to as the ‘female Obama’, and her campaign announcement in January drew 20,000+ people, the largest crowd for any candidate up until October. At points during these early months, she was considered one of the frontrunners. How did she end up with no money and very little support two months before the Iowa caucuses?
            Broadly speaking, one of the biggest contributing factors was her lack of a clear message, or reason for why it should be her over another candidate. The candidates who win nominations always have a simple theme to their campaign. Barack Obama offered a vision of a post-partisan (and implicitly a post-racial) America; Bernie Sanders champions a political revolution; Joe Biden sells a return-to-normal; Elizabeth Warren has built a brand on fighting for the middle class and ending corruption in Washington, etc. A clear message, especially in a crowded primary, is essential – it helps to differentiate one candidate from another, specifically when their policy positions are largely the same.
            Another huge factor was what Kamala described as ‘the donkey in the room’ – the issue of electability. After the 2016 election in which Trump surprised almost everyone by winning three Midwestern states that gave him the win in the Electoral College, the media and Democratic elites began putting a heavy emphasis on Democratic candidates needing to win back the white, working-class men who swung to Trump. This narrative has ignored the fact that minority (especially black) turnout was down dramatically from 2012, undoubtedly due to a black man no longer being on the ballot as well as specific and targeted attempts by Russia to suppress the black vote. Additionally, it is often forgotten that Democrats had an extremely flawed candidate in 2016. Still, elites messaging enforced the idea that only a white candidate, probably male, can win against Donald Trump, and that perception is perhaps best exhibited when observing that the four most-likely nominees are all white, and 3 are male. Moreover, so far, not a single person of color has met the polling threshold to qualify for the December debate.
            Structurally, the early-state nominating order of the Democratic primary, in which two disproportionally white and rural states (Iowa and New Hampshire) hold the first two nominating contests, likely compounded Sen. Harris’s perceived electability problem. That is not to say that voters in those two states are racist - after all, Iowa launched Barack Obama to the Presidency - but I believe it is fair to say that if South Carolina or another heavily diverse state were to hold the first contest, Kamala would have been given a longer look by voters and would also have been mentioned more by the media as a prohibitive frontrunner.
               As always, the media played a role in the demise of Sen. Harris’s campaign. Part of the issue is that beginning in August, after a fine but lackluster debate performance, the media simply stopped talking about Kamala Harris, at least relative to the three leading contenders at the time, Joe Biden, Elizabeth Warren, and Bernie Sanders. By that point in time, her position in the polls had fallen from 15% in early July to about half that. The candidate on the rise both in Iowa and nationally was Elizabeth Warren, and the media seemed to favor the ‘comeback-kid’ story of Warren.
Yet, the adage “all press is good press” is also not true, at least in this case. Sen. Harris’s campaign was subject to a great deal of negative coverage, much of it earned - most notable was her seeming flip-flop positions on Medicare-for-All. She had co-sponsored Sen. Sanders’s “damn bill”, yet by July, after hearing from voters across the country, Kamala said, she moderated by proposing a plan that would offer Medicare for anyone who wanted it but would also allow private insurance companies to still offer plans for a transitionary period of 10 years, though they would be subject to stricter regulation. The media, as well as the other candidates, who perhaps saw her as a threat, latched onto this turnabout by Harris, which just fed into the perception that she didn’t have an ideological core that informed her policy stances. For me, it reinforced my belief that she would be an excellent leader, because she has the ability to think pragmatically and change her mind when she’s presented with data and confronted with voters’ worries.
            Still, that perceived flip-flop was a moment in the campaign from which she could never recover. By October and through the end of November, just days before she formally closed shop, there were frequent stories about infighting in the campaign, mostly at the top. For my part, I never personally witnessed any kind of staff conflict in our region, but I was told that it happened, and it, along with the polls and negative headlines, created a sometimes-tense environment in which morale was low.

Lessons Learned and Going Forward 
            I learned a lot through this internship. I learned campaigning is tough work. It is seldom rewarding – I didn’t get my first ‘Commit to Caucus’ (C2C) from a voter until October. The hours, especially for paid staffers, are long, and the work is tedious. It mostly consists of making phone calls or knocking on doors all day. It puts a strain on families and on relationships. But the people who invest their time and energy into these campaigns are heroes to the idea of democracy. They are fighting not just on behalf of their preferred candidate, but in a representation of their own beliefs and values.
            I also learned how to best convince an undecided voter, at least in the Midwest. In the beginning, when canvassing, I would accept an answer of “I’m undecided” without further question or prodding. Perhaps as a result of how I was raised, I’m not keen on pressing a point or be seen as pushy. Rather, it is truer to my personality to accept opinions at face value and thank them for their time. This is clearly not a technique that lends itself well to campaigning. Gradually, as I became an effective subject matter expert on Sen. Harris and her positions, I found I was much more successful when I followed up by asking, “what issues matter most to you?” Then, I would be able to easily explain how Kamala would address that specific issue, and if asked, would contrast that with other candidates’ positions.
One thing I never changed about my approach is that I never spoke negatively of another candidate when interacting with voters, and I’m proud of that. Sure, there are a couple candidates in the field whom I dislike and disagree with on occasion, but negativity feeds hate, and hate is a path towards the dark side, as well as four more years of Donald Trump. The Democratic party and those fighting for its candidates must show Americans a different path and vision. It is not enough to simply replace the occupant of the oval office; whomever wins must go on to try to unite all Americans under a common purpose. Division, fear, and hate will never accomplish that.  
Going forward, I’m not going to let my candidates’ loss paralyze me or prevent me from staying in the fight. I’ve told myself that I will give myself a week or so to ‘grieve’, and then I will begin researching in earnest who most deserves my support. I clearly haven’t yet decided who that will be, and I look forward to hearing from my friends as well as organizers for other campaigns on why I should support their candidate. When I settle on a candidate, and especially when we have a nominee, I’m going to use what I learned to fight like hell for that person, and I couldn’t be more excited.


Thursday, August 30, 2018

No, Democrats Will Likely NOT Win the Senate This Year


Donald Trump’s Presidency has offered the Democrats a rare chance – and one they haven’t had in years – to take back the House in 2018. Nate Silver’s FiveThirtyEight is currently projecting that Democrats have about a 73% likelihood (or about a 5 in 7 chance) that Democrats will win back the House in November.

However, the picture isn’t so rosy for Democrats in the Senate. Due to a daunting map this year in which Democrats are defending ten seats in states Trump won in 2016 (and Republicans are only defending one such seat Clinton won - Nevada), it is very likely that Democrats will have fewer Senators in their caucus in 2019 than presently.

The below graph shows my current projection for the number of seats Democrats will hold after the 2018 midterms. In order to have a majority in the Senate, they must have 51 seats, as Vice President Mike Pence would be the tie-breaker should the chamber have a 50/50 split. That leaves the Democrats with only about a 5% likelihood of winning the Senate, even in what is looking like a gangbuster year for the party nationwide.


In the 10 democratic states Donald Trump won in 2016, four are considered “Toss-ups” (Florida, Indiana, Missouri, and North Dakota), two are “Leaning Democratic” (Montana and West Virginia), one is “Likely Democratic” (Wisconsin), and three are “Safe Democratic” (Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania). Of the seats Republicans are defending, only three are rated as “Toss-ups” (Arizona, Nevada, and Tennessee), and one is rated as “Likely Republican” (Texas).

To gain the majority, Democrats will need to net two seats, which means they could conceivably win all three Republican-held toss-ups and only lose one of their own, or they would have to keep all of their own seats while still picking up two Republican-held seats. Either of those scenarios is unlikely, given the heavily-Republican margins the states in the Democratic toss-ups. Trump won both Indiana and Missouri by 19 points and North Dakota by 36 points. And while he only won Florida by about 1%, the current multi-millionaire and self-financing Republican Governor Rick Scott is running against Senator Nelson. In order to compete against all that cash from Scott, Democrats will have to invest heavily into the race, which will take away from their efforts in other states.

As a side note, all projections are based on a combination of factors, mainly current polling, but also historic trends, cash on hand, and the current national environment. Nationwide, the generic congressional ballot polling suggests Democrats will win the popular vote by 7-8%, which would very likely mean they’d easily win the House. However, Senate Democrats fighting in the numerous red states won’t enjoy that same margin. As it currently stands, Republicans will likely hold between 51 and 53 seats in the upper chamber by January. In order for the Democrats to have a better shot of winning the Senate, they will need to move some of the toss-up races into the ‘lean Democratic’ column. I’ll be sure to update the Senate forecast as the election grows nearer.